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THE STRANGE CAREER OF RACE
DISCRIMINATION IN ANTEBELLUM
OHIO
Paul Finkelmant
The commonly told history of antebellum race relations in the
midwest, especially in Ohio, is one of a bleak and dismal landscape,
with discrimination everywhere. This view is expressed best by Leon
Litwack's assertion that on the eve of the Civil War "the northern
Negro remained largely disenfranchised, segregated, and economi-
cally oppressed" and, just as importantly, "change did not seem im-
minent."1 Similarly, Eugene Berwanger's influential book The Fron-
tier Against Slavery claimed that "[d]iscrimination against Negroes in
the Middle West reached its height between 1846 and 1860, the same
years in which the slavery extension controversy became most
acute. ' , The best study of post-civil war race relations in Ohio sum-
marized the antebellum period with the glum conclusion, "[t]he late
1850s found most Ohio blacks pariahs, restricted and scorned, living
in the state but in no accurate sense citizens."3 The author noted that
national issues-the new, draconian Fugitive Slave Law of 18504 and
the Dred Scott decision 5-" made the black position even less secure 6
t Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A.,
Syracuse, 1971; M.A. and Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1972, 1976; Fellow in Law and Hu-
manities, Harvard Law School, 1982-83. I thank my research assistant, Briana Ross, for help on
this article. I also thank the faculty of Case Western Reserve Law School for their comments on
this article. An earlier version of this article appeared as Race, Slavery, and Law in Antebellum
Ohio, in 2 THE HISTORY OF OHIO LAW 748-81 (eds. Michael Les Benedict and John F. Winkler)
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2004).
, LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES 279 (1961).
2 EUGENE F. BERWANGER, THE FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY: WESTERN ANTI-NEGRO
PREJUDICE AND THE SLAVERY EXTENSION CONTROVERSY 4 (reprint 2002) (1967).
3 DAVID A. GERBER, BLACK OHIO AND THE COLOR LINE, 1860-1915, at 23-24 (1976).
4 Fugitive Slave Act of Sept. 18, 1850, Ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
5 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
6 GERBER, supra note 3, at 24.
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by "threaten[ing] northern blacks with kidnapping and Star Chamber
justice."7
The legal history of race in antebellum Ohio is in fact more com-
plex than most historians have noted or understood. This complicated
story involves the state's legislature, courts, executive branch, and
numerous political leaders. Throughout the period, officials in some
localities, especially where antislavery was strong, provided greater
rights for blacks than the state Constitution and the state's laws man-
dated or even allowed. 8 Activist citizens-especially those who op-
posed the enforcement of the fugitive slave laws-also affected the
development of the law. Moreover, throughout the period the state's
policies toward African Americans were inconsistent and ambivalent.
For example, while discouraging black migration with a registration
system, Ohio never seriously enforced its rules, and its black popula-
tion grew rapidly during the first six decades of the century. Even
the definition of "black" was uncertain for much of the period, as the
Ohio courts tried to interpret statutes narrowly, thus giving full legal
rights and protections to people who had some black ancestry, but
were mostly of European or Indian background.9
The state also changed dramatically during the first sixty years of
the nineteenth century. In the years following statehood (in 1803),
Ohio reflected its southern roots and was more hostile to blacks than
most other free states. By the 1840s, however, Ohio moved into the
northern mainstream, if not quite the vanguard, of racial equality. In
1849 the state legislature took the lead in expanding black rights, and
in the half dozen years before the Civil War, Ohio's Republican gov-
ernors, Salmon Portland Chase and William Dennison, used the
power of their office to advance civil rights and to protect African
Americans from the reach of southern state governments, or a pro-
slavery national administration.
Local opposition to the presence of free blacks, or local opposition
to slavery, also shaped law and its implementation. In 1829, blacks
in Cincinnati were the victims of vicious race riots, which forced
many to leave the city.10 In 1834, racism and mob violence forced the
students and faculty of Lane Seminary to move out of the Queen City
7 Id.
8 For example, in Greene County (the home of Wilberforce College) light skinned blacks
voted in defiance of state law. See GERBER, supra note 3, at 12.
9 See Gray v. State, 4 Ohio 353 (1831). For a full discussion of this issue, see Jonathan
Entin, An Ohio Dilemma: Race, Equal Protection, and the Unfulfilled Promise of a State Bill of
Rights, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 395 (2004).
10 See Carter Woodson, The Negroes of Cincinnati Prior to the Civil War, I J. OF NEGRO
HIST. 1,7 (1916); see also NIKKI M. TAYLOR, FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM: CINCINNATI'S BLACK
COMMUNITY, 1802-1868 (2005).
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as well, in part because the white seminarians offered free education
to black children in the city. The students and faculty from Lane mi-
grated to Ohio's Western Reserve where they helped create Oberlin
College, the first racially integrated college in the country. In an
ironic twist, the students and faculty of that school would form a mob
of their own in 1858, but their purpose would be to help a fugitive
slave escape custody of his master and a federal marshal in the fa-
mous Oberlin-Wellington Rescue. In 1836 and 1841, whites in Cin-
cinnati opposed to black migration rioted. Cincinnati never became a
center of racial fairness in this period, but, in 1849, legislators from
that city helped to repeal the state's black laws and to send Salmon P.
Chase, Ohio's most famous antislavery lawyer, to the United States
Senate. In the 1850s, Cincinnati would resist state requirements to
provide education for blacks, and at no point did the city make blacks
feel welcome. Despite its racism, though, the city ranked third in the
nation in the number of free blacks owning property and in the total
and average value of that property." Furthermore, despite both offi-
cial and informal racism in the city, Cincinnati's black population
grew throughout the period. By 1860 the city had a disproportionate
percentage of the state's black population.
The complex story of race and rights in Ohio is vital to our under-
standing of race relations in mid-nineteenth century America. Ohio
reflected the changing, complex nature of race relations throughout
the North, as well as changing attitudes toward slavery. In the early
part of the century, Ohio was hostile to slavery within its own
boundaries, but most Ohioans were relatively unconcerned about the
existence of the institution in other states. Early Ohio was antipa-
thetic to the presence of African Americans and discouraged them
from moving into the state; however, it simultaneously provided
tough punishments for people kidnapping free blacks.
As Ohio matured and as its legal culture became more sophisti-
cated the state expanded the rights of blacks. In addition, most Ohio-
ans became more concerned about slavery as a national problem.
These changes led to hostility toward the enforcement of the fugitive
slave laws, and the refusal to grant comity to masters visiting the state
with their slaves reflected the transition of Ohio, and much of the
North, during the 1830s and 1840s. In the 1840s and 1850s, political
leaders, like Salmon P. Chase, William Dennison, and Jacob Brinker-
hoff, successfully worked to expand the rights of free blacks while
actively protecting fugitive slaves and their abolitionist allies from
I See LEONARD CURRY, THE FREE BLACK IN URBAN AMERICA, 1800-1850, at 250, 267
(1981).
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southern slave catchers and the long arm of a proslavery national
government. In the Civil War era, Ohio leaders like John A. Bing-
ham, James M. Ashley, Rutherford B. Hayes, and Benjamin F. Wade,
worked for a greater racial fairness as they helped shape the new con-
stitutional order that emerged after the war. Indeed, the views of the
core leaders of the Ohio Republican Party are central for understand-
ing the meaning and goal of the Fourteenth Amendment, which con-
stitutionalized what Abraham Lincoln so eloquently called a "new
birth of freedom."' 2 The author of that amendment, John Bingham,
was a successful Ohio politician and lifelong opponent of slavery and
proponent of racial justice. His Fourteenth Amendment reflected a
progressive view of race that had been emerging in northern Ohio for
decades. Bingham's political success illustrated the emergence in
antebellum Ohio of politicians dedicated to increasingly greater racial
fairness.
13
Despite the success of Ohio's Republican leaders, it is important to
remember that many Ohioans in the Civil War era did not support
black freedom or racial equality. Democratic politicians opposed to
emancipation or equality remained powerful before, during, and after
the War. The outspokenly racist Democrat, Clement L. Val-
landigham, while unable to win statewide office, nevertheless had a
substantial following, especially in the butternut regions of southern
Ohio. This support for the racial status quo was a carryover from an
earlier period of Ohio's legal and social history.
I. RACE IN ANTEBELLUM OHIO: AN OVERVIEW
In the years immediately following statehood Ohio was among the
most racist states in the North. Black males could not vote under the
first state constitution adopted in 1803. They were not explicitly pre-
vented from serving on juries, but, because jury service was tradition-
ally tied to the franchise, the constitution, in effect, deprived them of
this right.1 4 The newest northern state was more progressive on the
question of slavery. The state's first Constitution emphatically pro-
hibited both slavery and long term indentures for blacks. Thus Ohio
avoided the de jure and de facto bondage that later emerged in Illinois
and Indiana. 15 But beyond its hostility to slavery, the new state of-
12 Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865).
13 See Paul Finkelman, John Bingham and the Background to the Fourteenth Amendment,
36 AKRON L. REV. 671-92 (2003) (describing Bingham's role in writing the Fourteenth
Amendment).
'1 See Act of Feb. 9, 1831, § 1, 29 Ohio Laws 94, 94 (tying jury service to the right to
vote).
15 On the persistence of slavery and .other forms of bondage in Indiana and Illinois, see
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fered little promise to African Americans. Legislation adopted afterthe new Constitution went into effect further limited the rights ofblacks. Under the state's "Black Laws" of 1804 and 1807, AfricanAmericans entering Ohio had to prove their freedom, register withlocal authorities, and find an Ohio resident to sign a surety bond,guaranteeing both their good behavior and that they would not need toturn to the local government for their support. 16 Ohio prohibitedblacks from testifying in court against whites and gave them no legal
right to attend public schools.
Legislation adopted in 1849 dramatically altered the status ofblacks in Ohio. The legislature repealed the 1804 and 1807 laws
requiring surety bonds and proof of freedom. In addition, blacks
could now testify against whites, giving them important legal protec-
tion for both civil and criminal matters. Thus, two of the most op-pressive aspects of the black laws were no longer on the books.Blacks could enter and remain in the state unmolested by the law, andthey could defend their rights in court, even against a white person.Under the new law, school districts were not required to integratetheir schools, but they were not prohibited from doing so either.More importantly, school districts were now obligated to provide
some public education for blacks. African Americans in Ohio stillfaced disabilities. They could not vote in general elections's or serve
on juries. 19 In most of the state they were unable to attend the sameschools as their white neighbors, and they could not receive poor re-lief,20 even though their taxes were used to support it.
Although the 1849 legislation was not a complete victory for civil
rights, partisans on both sides of the issue understood the magnitude
of the change. After more than forty years, Ohio's black laws were
suddenly gone. Democrats, especially in southern Ohio, were ap-
PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OFJEFFERSON 37-80 (2d ed. 2001). See also JAMES SIMEONE, DEMOCRACY AND SLAVERY INFRONTIER ILLINOIS: THE BOTTOMLAND REPUBLIC (2000).
16 See Act of Jan. 5, 1804, 2 Ohio Laws 63 (regulating blacks and mulatto persons); seealso Act of Jan. 25, 1807, 5 Ohio Laws 53 (amending the Act of Jan. 5, 1804). These laws andother laws relating to race are conveniently reprinted in STEPHEN MIDDLETON, THE BLACKLAWS IN THE OLD NORTHWEST: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1993).
'7 See Act of Feb. 10, 1849, 47 Ohio Laws 17 (authorizing the establishment of separateschools for black children). Section 6 of this act quietly repealed the 1804 and 1807 acts. Id.18 Blacks could vote in elections for their own school boards in places that chose to createsegregated school systems. In addition, the state supreme court held in Jeffries v. Ankney, 11Ohio 372 (1842) that adult males of mixed ancestry who were more than half white could vote.19 See Act of Feb. 9, 1831, § 1, 29 Ohio Laws 94, 94.20 See Act of March 14, 1831, § 2, 29 Ohio Laws 320, 32 (noting "[tihat nothing in thisact shall be so construed as to enable any black or mulatto person to gain a legal settlement in
this State").
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palled. In Fairfield County, located in south central Ohio, citizens at
an "indignation meeting" complained that members of the state legis-
lature had "betrayed the confidence reposed in them by their constitu-
ents" and were "base hypocrites and dishonest politicians" for their
support of what this group called "free-soilism, abolitionism, dema-
gogism and negroism.
' 21
By 1861, the legislature had further developed this civil rights
revolution in Ohio. An 1853 law mandated that counties provide
some public education for blacks, although usually on a segregated
basis.2  Integration remained an option, however, and some local
school boards did open their schools to black students. A new per-
sonal liberty law, passed in 1857, offered greater protections to blacks
who might be seized as fugitive slaves.23 On the other hand, blacks in
Ohio were still excluded from the voting booth, the poor house, and
the jury box, and their separate schools were never equal to those
provided for whites.
II. THE CONSTITUTION OF 1802
The Convention that met to draft Ohio's first constitution was
dominated by southerners and by followers of Thomas Jefferson from
both the North and the South. A slight majority of the
delegates- fifteen of twenty-eight-were from the South, but some
migrants from Pennsylvania were also Jeffersonians. Like their
hero,24 these delegates believed that the rights of white men could
only be secured by denying rights to blacks. Theirs was a democracy
predicated on white supremacy.
While a narrow majority of the Convention was opposed to black
rights, an overwhelming majority of the delegates opposed allowing
outright slavery in the new state. Some opposed slavery on moral
grounds or as a matter of political principle. Others simply thought
slavery was antithetical to the kind of society they wanted to create.
These delegates had little sympathy for blacks but were convinced
that slavery would harm the state's economic growth, even if it en-
riched a few elite masters. Many of the Jeffersonian delegates also
21 Barbara Terzian, "Effusions of Folly and Fanaticism": Race, Gender, and Constitu-
tion-Making in Ohio, 1802-1923, at 177 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State
University) (on file with Ohio State University Library) (quoting OHIO EAGLE (Lancaster),
February 15, 1849, reprinted in OHIO STATESMAN (Columbus), February 22, 1849) (internal
quotations omitted).
22 See Act of March 14, 1853, §31, 51 Ohio Laws 429, 441 (providing for the reorganiza-
tion, supervision, and maintenance of the common schools).
23 See Act of April 17, 1857, 54 Ohio Laws 221 (preventing kidnapping).
24 On Jefferson's hostility to blacks and his Party's racism, see FINKELMAN, supra note
15, at 105-196.
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opposed slavery because they did not want any more blacks in their
presence.
A few of the delegates were sympathetic to allowing slavery, but
they were clearly in the minority. Moreover, all the delegates under-
stood that it would be impolitic to establish slavery in the new state.
The Northwest Ordinance had prohibited slavery in the region, and,
however ambiguous its language,2 5 virtually everyone at the conven-
tion was certain Congress would not allow Ohio to come into the Un-
ion as a slave state. Thus, the Constitution was clear and emphatic,
declaring, "[t]here shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude
in this state, otherwise than for the punishment of crimes, whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted. '2 6 This provision had the
unanimous support of the Convention.
The Convention also guarded against the indirect introduction of
slavery or some other form of long-term bondage, although here the
delegates were far less united. The draft Constitution prohibited the
indenture of any adults "unless such person shall enter into such in-
denture while in a state of perfect freedom, and on condition of bona-
fide consideration received, or to be received, for their service. ' ' 7
Indentures made when the laborer was not "in a state of perfect free-
dom" had been used and would continue to be used in what later be-
came Indiana and Illinois to evade the Northwest Ordinance's ban on
slavery. Masters brought their "ex-slaves" to Indiana and Illinois as
"indentured servants," but often the indentures were for extraordinary
lengths of time, sometimes for as long as ninety-nine years. This
created a de facto form of slavery.28 The indenture clause in Ohio's
draft constitution would prevent such de facto slavery. By a vote of
twenty-one to twelve the convention defeated a motion to delete it.
29
This vote suggests that more than one-third of the delegates wanted to
permit some sort of black bondage without openly instituting slavery.
Such sentiments did not bode well for the future of blacks in Ohio.
The final constitution banned indentures of blacks made outside the
state and any made within the state for a term longer than one year.
30
This was again a necessary precaution against the introduction of
quasi-slavery. Without such a provision, it would have been a simple
25 Id. at 37-57.
26 OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VRI, § 2.
27 Id.
28 On the perpetuation of slavery in Indiana and Illinois, see FINKELMAN, supra note 15, at
ch. 4 (discussing "'The Persistence of Bondage in Indiana and Illinois").
29 Terzian, supra note 21, at 99.
10 See OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 2.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
matter for masters in Kentucky or Virginia to force a slave to sign a
long term indenture and then bring the now "free" black into Ohio.
Opposition to slavery and bondage did not, however, translate into
support for black rights. In a series of close votes, the convention
limited suffrage to white men. In so doing, Ohio reversed what had
been a trend towards racial inclusion in the United States. At the
time, free blacks were allowed to vote in half of the states, including
two in the South: North Carolina and Tennessee. The two northern
states that did not enfranchise blacks in this period, Connecticut and
Rhode Island, were the only states that had not adopted new constitu-
tions after independence, and thus, they had not changed their fran-
chise rules for anyone. Two new states, Vermont (1791) and Ten-
nessee (1796), also granted the franchise to free black men. Further-
more, free blacks had voted in the Ohio Territory. Given all these
facts, it seems odd that the state did not enfranchise free blacks.
Nonetheless, the Convention disenfranchised African Americans
in Ohio. The southern-born delegates, most of whom came from Vir-
ginia, were clearly unable to imagine a world in which blacks had
political rights. They were joined by the Jeffersonians from the North
who, like their leader and hero, generally considered free blacks to be
"pests" upon the body politic. 3' Allowing free blacks to vote might
also encourage them to come into Ohio, which the southern majority
at the convention clearly did not want.
In denying black Ohioans the vote, Ohio was in the vanguard of
racial attitudes in pre-Civil War America. Rejecting the relatively
tolerant racial policies of the age of federalism, 32 Ohio initiated the
Jeffersonian-Jacksonian assault on black rights. From 1800 until the
Civil War only Rhode Island would expand its suffrage to include
free blacks. During that same period four other states-New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Tennessee-would take the suf-
frage away from black men while a fifth state, New York, would lib-
eralize its suffrage rules for whites but not for blacks. With the ex-
ception of Maine, which had been a part of Massachusetts until its
admission in 1820, all states entering the Union from 1800 until the
Civil War denied the vote to free blacks.
The Ohio constitution-makers also provided that representation in
the new state legislature would be based on the population of adult
free white males.33 This was unusual since both the U.S. Constitution
31 See Thomas Jefferson to Edward Coles, August 25, 1814, in MERRILL D. PETERSON,
THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 546 (1975).
32 See FINKELMAN, supra note 15, at ch. 5 (discussing Federalists' more tolerant attitude
towards blacks' rights).
-3 See OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. I, § 2.
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and most of the other state constitutions based representation on the
entire free population, male and female, white and black, adult and
child. It is hard to imagine why the Convention chose this method of
allocating representation, but whatever the reason, it clearly sent a
message that blacks were unwanted, either as slaves or as free people.
The delegates considered, but rejected by a very narrow margin, a
provision that would have prevented blacks from holding office in the
state. The final constitution provided no racial qualifications for of-
fice holding, while specifically denying the vote to blacks.34
Why prevent blacks from voting but not holding office?
A shift of a few votes would have also explicitly prevented black
office holding. Why was the convention able to muster the votes to
stop black voting but not black office holding? There is no clear or
certain answer to this question. One explanation is that a few dele-
gates who had opposed black rights on other issues may have be-
lieved the people had a right to choose whomever they wanted for
public office. It is also possible that some of the delegates who were
hostile to black rights may have thought it so inconceivable that any-
one would elect a black that it seemed absurd, or even paranoid, to
ban them from holding office.35 Alternatively, some of the delegates
may have believed they should follow the pattern set out in other con-
stitutions at this time, which did not set out racial (or gender) qualifi-
cations for office holding. The United States Constitution, for exam-
ple, detailed age and citizenship qualifications for officeholders but
not ones based on race or gender. Yet, no one at the Constitutional
Convention in 1787 could have imagined that blacks or women would
have been elected to public office. Ohio may simply have been fol-
lowing this pattern. None of these explanations are wholly satisfac-
tory; perhaps, the rejection of this clause must be seen as simply one
more way in which early Ohio was inconsistent, or ambivalent, in its
treatment of blacks.
34 Id. at art. I, §§ 4-7; art. H, § 3. The Constitution also denied the vote to women but did
not explicitly prevent them from holding office. The provisions of Article II, setting out the role
of the governor, do not have a racial or gender qualification of the office, but do refer to the
governor as "he." This does not seem to be a gender limitation, however.
35 In the 1850s residents in Lorain County, in the Western Reserve, would elect an African
American, John Mercer Langston, to public office. Langston was very light skinned and proba-
bly more than half white, and thus able to vote under the state supreme court's interpretation of
the constitution. Nevertheless, all his neighbors understood him to be "black."
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III. LEGISLATING SECOND-CLASS STATUS
The Ohio Constitution of 1802 did not explicitly restrict black
rights beyond the franchise, but it set a tone for subsequent legislation
that made early Ohio a place where blacks had few rights. An act of
1803 required the enrollment of "able-bodied white male citizen[s]"
in the militia.36 While not explicitly prohibiting blacks from serving,
the law implied they were unwelcome. While this law was consistent
with the federal militia law, it nevertheless set a tone for the role of
blacks in early Ohio: they were not seen as full fledged members of
the society and thus had neither the rights nor the obligations of
whites. It can also be seen as a further rejection of concepts of equal-
ity that had existed a quarter of a century earlier when blacks had
served in northern militias and in the Continental Army during the
Revolution. Whatever the motivation, in an age when militia service
was a mark of belonging to the community, the clause underscored
that black men did not belong to the community. They might be in
the community, but they could never be part of the community.
In 1804, the legislature made more explicit the second class status
of blacks in Ohio. "An act, to regulate black and mulatto persons"
required all blacks living in the state to register with county offi-
cials.37 Each registration required a fee of 12.5 cents to be paid to the
clerk of the court. The law was ambiguous about whether the fee had
to be paid for every member of a family or whether an entire family
could be included under one registration and one fee. This fee was
relatively low, but nevertheless, in the cash-poor economy of early
Ohio, it did place some burden on African Americans. The law also
required that blacks entering the state provide proof of their status as
free people and register as free people within two years of entering
the state. Proof of freedom could only be established by a certificate
of freedom issued by a court, signed by the clerk of the court, and
certified with the seal of the court. Any whites hiring unregistered
blacks or blacks who could not prove their freedom were subject to a
fine of fifty dollars. If the unregistered black was a fugitive slave the
hirer could also be fined fifty cents a day, payable to the owner of the
slave, for every day the fugitive was hired.
Various provisions dealing with fugitive slaves suggest that the
1804 law can be seen as a good faith effort on the part of Ohio to ac-
commodate the needs of its southern neighbors on this important is-
36 "An Act to provide for organizing and disciplining the militia," 2 Ohio Laws 5 (1803).
No specific date is given for the passage of this law, although it was probably passed in Decem-
ber 1803.
37 Act of Jan. 5, 1804, 2 Ohio Laws 63.
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sue. In addition to the daily penalty for hiring fugitives, people con-
victed of knowingly harboring fugitives could be fined from ten to
fifty dollars. The law allowed masters or their agents to obtain court
orders from state judges or local justices of the peace for the arrest of
fugitives. The law required that local sheriffs execute these orders.
While this law was directed at preventing fugitive slaves from set-
tling in Ohio, the law also was clearly designed to discourage black
migration into the state. Bona fide free blacks leaving Kentucky or
Virginia would be unlikely to know that in this new "free" state, they
would be required to document their freedom. Such documentation
would also have been unavailable for slaves informally manumitted
by their owners. Fugitive slaves would of course be unable to prove
their freedom.
Despite the obvious hostility towards the presence of blacks in the
state, the law also suggests that Ohioans were conflicted and ambiva-
lent about how they should treat African Americans. The legislature
might have simply prohibited free blacks from entering Ohio. By the
1830s most of the southern slave states would ban the migration of
free blacks into their jurisdiction. In its 1851 Constitution, Indiana
would also prohibit blacks from migrating to the state. Yet, the Ohio
legislature did not take such an extreme step. Furthermore, while
placing burdens on free blacks coming into Ohio, the law simultane-
ously provided some fundamental protections for those free blacks
who were legally in the state. Similarly, while willing to help masters
recover their runaway slaves, Ohio also offered some protection for
free blacks who might be victims of kidnappers.
The registration process, while symbolic of the second-class status,
was not terribly onerous. The registration fee of 12.5 cents, while a
burden, was not prohibitive. Had Ohio wanted to chase out its free
blacks altogether, a higher fee might have been imposed. Similarly,
the two year window for free blacks entering the state to register al-
lowed black migrants the opportunity to prove their freedom. It gave
free blacks from Kentucky, Virginia, and elsewhere time to write
back home to obtain the proper documents to secure their freedom in
Ohio. It also gave penniless free blacks a chance to earn enough
money to pay the registration fee. Again, had Ohio been interested in
truly preventing free blacks from entering the state, it might have
required immediate registration, with a much higher registration free.
Ohio's ambivalent treatment of free blacks is more readily appar-
ent when the 1804 law is contrasted with Pennsylvania's gradual abo-
lition act of 1780. Pennsylvania's 1780 act was designed to gradually
end slavery in the state. The law required that all masters living in the
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state on March 1, 1780 register their slaves. Pennsylvania charged
masters a two dollar registration fee for every slave they owned and
gave masters a very short window of opportunity to comply with this
requirement. Any slaves improperly registered, or not registered at
all, became free. Some Pennsylvania slaves ultimately gained their
freedom because of faulty registrations or the failure of masters to
register them. 38 Pennsylvania made it difficult and relatively expen-
sive for masters to register their slaves while Ohio made it relatively
easy, and quite inexpensive, for free blacks to register. Such a regis-
tration would secure their status as free people. In Pennsylvania the
cost of failing to register a slave was loss of the slave. Failure to reg-
ister a slave also led to immediate and permanent freedom for the
black in question. The Ohio law, however, contained no penalty for
African Americans who failed to register. Presumably, unregistered
blacks would simply have to register, if confronted by the authorities,
or face expulsion from the county or state if they failed to prove their
freedom. Moreover, while the registration process clearly hurt fugi-
tive slaves, registration gave free blacks some protection from kid-
napping by providing some proof of their free status.
The last section of this act dealt directly with kidnapping, illustrat-
ing that the Ohio legislature understood the need to protect free black
people. The law provided a $1,000 fine for anyone removing, or at-
tempting to remove, a black person from the state without first obtain-
ing legal process from a judge or justice of the peace. Half of this
money would go to an informer, thus giving Ohioans a huge incentive
to protect the liberty of their black neighbors. In addition, the black
victim retained a right to sue the kidnapper for damages. The $1,000
fine-a huge sum of money at the time-for taking blacks out of the
state without following the letter of the law contrasts sharply with the
ten to fifty dollar fine for harboring a fugitive slave.
The 1804 law suggests the ambivalence within Ohio on the status
and presence of African Americans. They were unwanted, but not
banned or expelled. When legally present the state would protect
their freedom. Their migration into the state was discouraged but not
prohibited.
An 1807 amendment to this law further burdened, but did not ban,
black migration. 39 The amendment raised the fine for hiring unregis-
tered blacks from $50 to $150, which surely discouraged some whites
38 See PAUL F1NKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY
ch. 2 (reprint ed. Lawbook Exchange, 2000).
39 See Act of Jan. 25, 1807, 5 Ohio Laws 53 (amending 1804 law regulating black and
mulatto persons).
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from hiring blacks. But there is scant evidence that any whites were
ever fined under the hiring provision. More importantly, the 1807
amendment required that blacks entering the state find two or more
sureties to give bond of five hundred dollars that the black would not
become a burden on the local community. This law has often been
misunderstood as requiring that blacks entering the state post a cash
bond.4° In fact the law did not require that any money actually be
posted. Rather, as a surety bond, the law required that two freehold-
ers in the community agree to pay up to five hundred dollars if the
migrating black violated the terms of the law. The law required that
blacks maintain "good behavior" and not be a burden on the commu-
nity. Sureties might not be able to control the "good behavior" of an
African American, but they would certainly have been able to prevent
blacks from becoming a burden on the community by simply provid-
ing them with work, or at least some food and shelter, if they were in
need. This was clearly not an ideal situation, but it was not an impos-
sible one. By the 1830s and 1840s, with a growing number of black
property owners in Cincinnati, Cleveland, Greene County, and Ober-
lin, it would have been possible to find some black sureties if the law
were actually enforced.4'
However, there is little evidence that this law was enforced with
any consistency or very effectively. There are no appellate cases in-
terpreting the registration laws. Given the strong and litigious anti-
slavery movement in the state, especially after 1830, it seems likely
that any serious enforcement would have been met with legal resis-
tance and appeals to higher courts.42 Other evidence also suggests a
reluctance to enforce the law. For example, Tom v. Daily43 and State
v. Carnea144 both involved free blacks born in other states. Yet in
neither case did the court, or anyone else, question the legality of the
blacks involved in these cases being in the state.45 Had officials been
eager to enforce the laws they would have used cases such as these to
40 See, e.g., BERWANGER, supra note 2, at 23 (stating that blacks were required to post a
$500 bond before establishing residence in Ohio).
41 See KENNETH KUSMER, A GHETTO TAKES SHAPE: BLACK CLEVELAND, 1870-1930, at22 (1976) (noting that in 1850, 23.6% of all black households in Cleveland owned some real
property).
42 See generally GILBERT HOBBS BARNES, THE ANTISLAVERY IMPULSE, 1830-
1844 (1933) (examining the anti-slavery movement in Ohio).
43 4 Ohio 368 (1831).
44 State v. Carneal (1817), in OHIO UNREPORTED JUDICIAL DECISIONS PRIOR TO 1823, at
133 (ed. Ervin H. Pollack 1952) [hereinafter OHIO UNREPORTED JUDICIAL DECISIONS (ed.
Pollack 1952)].
45 See Documents: Transplanting Free Negroes to Ohio from 1815 to 1858, 1 J. OF NEGRO
HIST. 302-17 (1916) (discussing migration of blacks without obeying the laws of 1804 and
1807).
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expose unregistered blacks. This, however, does not seem to have
ever happened.
Despite lax or non-existent enforcement, the 1804 and 1807 laws
stood squarely for the proposition that blacks were unwanted in Ohio.
Moreover, as long as these laws remained on the books, they were a
potential weapon to be turned on any free black who was not in full
compliance.
The 1807 amendment also appeared to close the loophole in the
1804 law which had failed to indicate a penalty for blacks who did
not register. Under the new law, any black who did not register or
find sureties could be removed from the township "in the same man-
ner, as is required in the case of paupers. 46 It is not at all clear how
this provision would have in fact worked for blacks coming from
other states. The poor law of 1805 allowed for, but did not require,
the removal of a poor person from the township if that person had not
obtained residence in the township. Under the law paupers could be
sent to the township of their last residence within the state. If from
out of state, the law allowed, but significantly did not require, local
authorities to "remove such person or persons to the state or county
where they have a legal settlement, unless such person or persons
shall give sufficient security to indemnify the said township."
47 Re-
moval under this law was wholly within the discretion of the town-
ship trustees, and even that discretion could have been trumped by
providing "sufficient security to indemnify" the township.
As a matter of statutory construction the provision of the 1807 law
referring to the poor laws was probably void because it mandated the
impossible. The 1807 law provided for the removal of blacks, "in the
same manner, as is required in the case of paupers., 48 But the poor
laws did not actually require that paupers be removed if they came
from other states. Furthermore, the 1805 law allowed out-of-state
paupers to avoid removal by giving "security" to the township.49 By
analogy, blacks who failed to register-perhaps because they did not
have proper papers-might avoid removal by posting a bond. More-
over, the enormous amount of discretion built into the poor law meant
that, in those parts of Ohio where antislavery sentiment was strong,
the trustees of the township would probably be disinclined to order
the overseers of the poor to remove free blacks, arguing that they had
the same discretion as the overseers of the poor. Even in areas hostile
46 Act of Jan. 25, 1807, § 1,5 Ohio Laws 53, 54.
47 Act of Feb. 22, 1805, § 5, 3 Ohio Laws 272, 276 (providing relief to the poor).
48 Act of Jan. 25, 1807, § 1, 5 Ohio Laws 53, 54.
49 Act of Feb. 22, 1805, § 5, 3 Ohio Laws 272, 275-76.
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to the presence of blacks, there seems to have been little public sup-
port most of the time50 to send fugitive slaves or free blacks without
papers back to the South.
The registration and removal provision of this law were ultimately
ineffective. The black population of the state rose consistently
throughout the nineteenth century. Ohio had a black population of
337 by 1800; this population had grown by more than 550% to 1,899
in 1810, despite the fact that anti-immigration laws were on the books
for six of those years. In the next decade, with the new harsher 1807
law in place, the black population more than doubled to 4,723. It
doubled again in the next decade reaching 9,568 by 1830, giving Ohio
the fourth largest black population in the North. By 1840, the black
population was 17,342, and in 1850, a year after the registration laws
went off the books, the census found 25,279 blacks in the state, push-
ing Ohio past New Jersey to give it the third largest black population
in the North.5'
The Northeastern and New England states, like New Jersey, had
begun with sizeable slave populations at the time of the Revolution.
Ohio, on the other hand, had had almost no blacks-slave or free-at
the time of statehood. Thus, the growth of Ohio's black population
was clearly due to in-migration. In 1850, slightly more than half of
Ohio's blacks had been born outside the state. Many more were the
Ohio-born children of black immigrants. This shows a marked con-
trast with Pennsylvania and New York, which never had any migra-
tion restrictions. These two states had the largest and second largest
black populations, but only 29% and 23% of the blacks in those states
had migrated from other states. 52
While these laws made life precarious for free blacks in that they
could be forced from the state, the impressive growth of the black
population during the years the laws were on the books supports the
conclusion that the laws were not enforced very often or with much
50 At the time of the 1829 Cincinnati race riot there were calls for the enforcement of the
registration and expulsion laws, and some blacks clearly left the city because they feared these
laws, but no out-of-state unregistered blacks were expelled from Ohio at this time.
51 U.S. Census, Negro Population, 1790-1915, at 57 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1915).
52 U.S. Census, Statistics of the United States (Including Mortality, Property, &c.,) in
1860: Compiled From the Original Returns, at xxxviii, Table XVII (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1866). Indiana and Illinois had similar restrictions that were equally unenforced
during most of this period. Between 1810 and 1850 the Indiana black population grew from 630
(including slaves) to 11,262, and in 1850 more than half (54%) had been born out of state. In
the 1850s the growth Indiana's black population came to a virtual halt, in part the result of
actual enforcement of its registration laws. In Illinois the black population grew from 781
(including slaves) in 1810 to 5,436 in 1850, with 50% from out of the state. However, in the
1850s the black population grew by nearly 50% to 7,628.
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vigor. The situation in Cincinnati illustrates this. The city had 410
blacks in 1820, which represented slightly less than 10% of the state's
total black population. In 1829 attacks on the black community by
negrophobic whites led many free blacks in Cincinnati to move else-
where; many who left were unregistered, and had been threatened
with expulsion under the 1807 act. But by 1830 the population was at
1,087, just over 11% of the state's black population. Riots by whites
in the city in 1836 and 1841 may have led to some out-migration; but,
this time there was apparently no attempt to enforce the registration
laws.53 The hostility of some segments of the local white population
was clearly a greater threat to blacks than the statutes. Ultimately,
however, neither the laws nor riotous behavior could discourage free
blacks and fugitive slaves from the beacon of liberty that the Queen
City represented on the free side of the Ohio River. By 1850, the city
had 3,237 blacks, nearly 13% of the state's black population.54
While the registration requirements of the 1807 law were not terri-
bly effective in stemming black migration, the last and shortest sub-
stantive provision of the law had a more profound effect on blacks in,
Ohio. Section 4 declared that "no black or mulatto person" would "be
permitted to be sworn or give evidence in any court ... in any cause
depending, or matter of controversy, where either party to the same is
a white person. 55 This law undermined the ability of blacks to use
the legal system to protect themselves from either criminal assaults or
civil harms. This was without question the most onerous limitation
on black rights in Ohio. It set blacks off as second class citizens in a
way that no one else was isolated. Other Ohioans faced various dis-
abilities. White women and white children, although citizens of the
state, could not vote or serve on juries; immigrant white males could
not vote; poor white migrants might be expelled from the community
by the overseers of the poor. But all of these classes of people could
defend their rights in court, could testify against their assailants, and
be a witness on behalf of others. Only blacks, whatever their age,
gender, or economic status, were denied the right to testify in court
against whites.
This law resulted in whites not being prosecuted for crimes,56 and
led blacks to persistently complain about this law. Without the right
53 See Woodson, supra note 10, at 5-17.
5 On the growth and development of the free black community in Cincinnati, see
TAYLOR, supra note 10.
55 Act. of Jan. 25, 1807, § 4, 5 Ohio Laws 53, 54.
56 See STEPHEN MIDDLETON, THE BLACK LAWS: RACE AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN
EARLY OHIO (2005) (forthcoming 2005) (analyzing, among other racial barriers under Ohio's
Black laws, the limits placed on black testimony against whites).
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to testify, African Americans were fundamentally vulnerable.57 Any
white could assault or even murder a black, and no one could be pun-
ished for the crime if there were no white witnesses. The Colored
American, an African American newspaper in Cincinnati reported
various instances of blacks being swindled or defrauded by whites,
but they were unable to obtain justice in the courts because of the
testimony law.58 This provision of the law, more than any other, made
blacks truly second-class citizens.
One case that reached the Ohio Supreme Court led to both an
ironic definition of race and a person who was probably guilty of a
crime escaping punishment. Gray v. Ohio,59 involved the robbery
prosecution of Polly Gray, a woman of mixed racial ancestry. Gray
had some African ancestry, but was clearly more than half white. She
appealed her conviction on the grounds that the chief witness against
her was a mulatto, and thus could not testify against a "white" person.
Gray claimed that since she was more than half white, she was
"white" under the statute. 60 The Ohio Court was uncomfortable with
the dilemma before it, but in the end accepted Gray's argument, not-
ing that it had "no alternative but to yield to the ... legislative will."'6'
Thus, the Court overturned Gray's conviction. The Court's notion of
the legislative will here is intriguing. It is unlikely that the 1807 leg-
islature contemplated different hues of "whiteness" and the authors of
the statute may very well have used "mulatto" to mean anyone of
mixed racial ancestry. But, the Court felt it must construe the statute
narrowly and thus held that Gray was "white," and could not be con-
victed on the testimony of a "mulatto."
IV. SCHOOLS, BLACKS, AND DISCRIMINATION
After 1807 Ohio continued to reaffirm the second-class status of
blacks. Issues surrounding the education of black children illustrate
Ohio's continuing hostility toward blacks and, at the same time, the
state's ambivalent and confused policies.
In 1825 Ohio passed its first comprehensive school law, directing
county commissioners to collect taxes for the creation of "common
57 In Woods v. Green, I Wright 503 (Ohio 1834) the Ohio Supreme Court allowed whites
to testify that a horse appeared to recognize a black woman who claimed to own the horse.
Evidence of the horse's apparent recognition of its black owner was allowed, when proved by
white witnesses.
58 THE COLORED AMERICAN, (Cincinnati) January 23, 1841 and March 22, 1838; see also
NORTH INTO FREEDOM: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN MALVIN, 1795-1880 (Allan Peskin ed.,
6th ed., 1966). For more discussion of this, see MIDDLETON, supra note 56.
59 4 Ohio 353 (1831).
6 Id.
61 Id. at 354.
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schools, for the instruction of youth of every class and grade without
distinction. 62 This law, on its face, seemed to allow blacks to attend
the public schools. It is not clear if the legislature intended this or
simply failed to focus on the racial issues at stake.
In 1829 the legislature clarified its intent, explicitly prohibiting
blacks from attending schools created for whites. The same law ex-
empted blacks from paying taxes for the common schools. Instead,
school taxes from blacks, if collected, were to be used only "for the
education of said black or mulatto persons. 63 Another law passed
that year, applying only to Cincinnati, specifically prohibited blacks
from attending schools with whites in that city, but also authorized
officials to collect taxes from blacks for the creation of schools solely
for black children. 64
The implications of these laws are complex. The equality in the
1825 law was almost certainly a legislative oversight and not a short-
lived attempt at integrated schools. If this is correct, then at first
glance these laws seem to reflect the racism of early Ohio. However,
a careful analysis undermines this simple explanation. These statutes,
while expressing hostility toward racial equality, also indicate a per-
ception that the state should facilitate some public education for
blacks. This aspect of the education laws was actually a progressive
innovation, following more than two decades in which the state com-
pletely ignored the educational needs of blacks. In other words, al-
though discriminatory, segregated education was an improvement
over no education at all.65 It was also an advance over the situation in
the slave states, where it was always illegal to educate slaves, some-
times illegal to educate free blacks, and where the government never
facilitated in the creation of educational opportunities for free blacks.
Unfortunately, the 1829 legislation was ill conceived to accom-
plish the creation of schools for blacks. In most places in Ohio there
were insufficient black property owners to raise enough money to
actually open a school for blacks.
The legislature apparently quickly came to understand this. A new
law passed in 1831 reaffirmed the policy of establishing schools for
whites, but no longer authorized local authorities to collect taxes from
62 Act of February 5, 1825, 23 Ohio Laws 36 (providing for the support and better regula-
tion of common schools).
63 Act of Feb. 10, 1829, §1, 27 Ohio Laws 72, 73 (providing for the support and better
regulation of common schools).
64 See Act of Feb. 12, 1829, § 3, 27 Ohio Laws 33 (creating schools for black children).
65 See Howard N. Rabinowitz, More Than the Woodward Thesis: Assessing the Strange
Career of Jim Crow, 75 J. OF AM. HIST. 842 (1988). Rabinowitz "discovered" that what pre-
ceded segregation in the post-Civil War South "was normally exclusion" and that "ironically,
segregation often therefore marked an improvement in the status of blacks." Id. at 845.
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blacks to establish schools for blacks. Instead, the tax authorities
were to abate any school taxes collected from African Americans.66
The apparent goal of the 1831 law was to prevent whites from hav-
ing to support black education, while removing the state from the
business of helping create public schools for blacks. Thus, this law
would appear to be a step back even from the 1829 law, which au-
thorized segregated schools. However, there are two complications to
this facile analysis.
By exempting blacks from school taxes the state effectively al-
lowed blacks to finance their own schools with their own funds. Such
schools were, in fact, created in some parts of the state and could be
organized around churches or other black institutions without any
state supervision or intervention.67
More significantly, the 1831 law, unlike the 1829 Act, did not ex-
pressly prohibit blacks from attending schools with whites. The law
mandated there be free public schools for the "instruction of the white
youth of every class and grade. 68 But the law said nothing about
whether black children could also attend them. Thus, it was possible
for a county to believe it could allow blacks to attend the public
schools either for free or by paying tuition. In a few scattered places
blacks attended schools with whites.
The Ohio Supreme Court addressed this issue in Chalmers v.
Stewart (1842),69 which also illustrates the complexity of black
schooling in antebellum Ohio. School officials in Greene County
hired Stewart to "keep a common school," paying him out of the
common school fund. In addition, he received $2.00 per student for
teaching sixty days, to be paid directly by the parents of the students.
The 1839 school law specifically allowed for such arrangements.
Chalmers, a parent, refused to pay the $2.00 fee because Stewart had
admitted "colored" students into the school. The Ohio Supreme
Court found that Stewart's action was sufficient to release the white
6 Act of Mar. 10, 1831, § 1, 29 Ohio Laws 414, 414 (providing "for the support and bet-
ter regulation of common schools").
67 See David L. Calkins, Black Education in Nineteenth Century Cincinnati, 38
CINCINNATI HISTORICAL SOCIETY BULLETIN 115 (1980), reprinted in 2 BLACK COMMUNITIES
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICA, 1720-1990, at 155 (Kenneth L. Kusmer, ed., 1991)(noting how after the state prohibited blacks from attending public schools, blacks in Cincinnati
were forced to seek education elsewhere, leading to the creation of black schools).
68 Act of Mar. 10, 1831, § 1, 29 Ohio Laws 414, 414. The legislature reaffirmed this prin-
ciple in the Act of Mar. 7, 1838, 36 Ohio Laws 21 (providing "[flor the support and better
regulation of Common Schools" by establishing a fund "for the education of all white youth")
and the Act of Mar. 16, 1839, 37 Ohio Laws 61 (amending the Act. of Mar. 7, 1838 and reaf-
firming in Sec. 8 that "all white youth" in Ohio "shall have equal privileges in all the common
schools in this state").
69 Chalmers v. Stewart, 11 Ohio 386 (1842).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
parents from any obligation to pay the additional subscription to
Stewart. The Court asserted that
By law, white children, only, have the privileges of common
schools. A teacher, therefore, can only admit such in a public
school, supported in whole or in part by the public funds. If
he does admit blacks, he violates the obligation on his part to
keep a legal school; and it would be unjust to hold the promi-
sor bound by a contract which the promisee disregarded....
The Court asserted, that under the statute, the teacher had an "obli-
gation not to admit blacks" which the Court found "is imposed by
statute.,71
The outcome of this case and the analysis of the Ohio Supreme
Court is not entirely clear. The Court remanded the suit back to the
county to determine if Stewart had in fact admitted black children,
which the court defined as having a "predominance" of black ances-
try-more than half black. If the trial court determined that, then
Chambers would not be obligated to pay the $2.00 per student as pro-
vided by his contract with Stewart. But this result would still not
have prevented blacks from attending the school. Significantly,
Chalmers did not sue to force Stewart to expel the black children, but
only to avoid having to pay his extra fee to Stewart.
Here a teacher was ready to provide education for African Ameri-
can children and apparently most white parents were willing to accept
this. School officials also were amenable to this arrangement. This
case once more illustrates the complexity of race relations and law
enforcement in Ohio at this time.
Greene County was clearly not the only place in the state in which
blacks were sometimes admitted to the public schools. In Cleveland,
the city council "helped subsidize a private school for black children"
in the 1840s, but "by the end of that decade" the city's "public educa-
tion system had been completely integrated. ' '72 The state's school
laws were ambiguous.73 The 1838 law provided that public education
would be "free for all the white children in the district, under such
regulations as may be adopted to secure to each an equal participation
70 Id. at 387.
71 Id. at 388.
72 For evidence of blacks attending school with whites in Cleveland, see KUSMER, supra
note 41, at 16.
73 Cleveland provides another example of this ambiguity. Cleveland's 1835 charter re-
quired the city to make schools "accessible to all white children." Id. But, clearly the city lead-
ers interpreted this clause to allow for the education of blacks with some public funds.
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therein," while exempting blacks from paying school taxes. 74  This
would appear to bar blacks, but it may not have; some districts may
have allowed black parents to pay tuition at public schools. The 1839
school act provided that school officials could charge tuition for chil-
dren who were not eligible to attend the district schools. The statute
specifically mentioned collecting tuition from non-residents who
might wish to send their children to the district school. But officials
may have used this provision to integrate their schools with the chil-
dren of non-taxpaying African Americans. Since they did not pay
school taxes, depending on the tuition cost, this might have resulted in
some blacks paying no more for schooling than whites paid.
This reality may be reflected in an 1848 law that provided that
taxes would be collected from African Americans and paid to the
common school fund "in any such district in which the children of
black or colored persons are permitted to attend the common schools
with the children of white persons. 75 This law subsequently referred
to townships where "the white inhabitants will not permit them [black
children] to attend said schools, 76 discussing how blacks in those
townships would be educated. This law did not explicitly create any
new right for blacks to attend schools with whites. Nor did it address
the dicta in Chalmers v. Stewart that public schools could not open
their doors to blacks. Rather, the 1848 Act seemed to recognize the
fact that in some parts of Ohio blacks were attending public schools
with whites. Most significantly, the legislature not only recognized
this reality, but sanctioned it as well.
The 1848 laws allowed for the collection of taxes from blacks and
the creation of schools for them where there were at least twenty
black children of school age. Significantly, these laws recognized
that some school districts might choose to integrate, but also allowed
white taxpayers to avoid contributing to black education if their dis-
tricts integrated.77 The 1849 law explicitly allowed blacks to attend
schools with whites, if no white taxpayers objected. 78 This ratified
the social reality in Cleveland, Oberlin, and other places. It also con-
firmed the new legal regime that the 1848 law had implicitly recog-
nized.
74 Act of Mar. 7, 1838, §9, 36 Ohio Laws 21, 25 (providing for "the support and better
regulation of Common Schools, and to create permanently the office of Superintendent").
71 Act of Feb. 24, 1848, § 1, 46 Ohio Laws 81, 81 (amending the Act of Mar. 7, 1838 andproviding "for the establishment of Common Schools for the education of the children of black
and mulatto persons").
76 Id. at § 6.
77 Id.
78 Act of Feb. 10, 1849, 47 Ohio Laws 17 (authorizing "the establishment of separate
schools for the education of colored children").
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Antebellum Ohio never provided equal education for free blacks,
as did parts of New England.79 But, neither did it prevent free blacks
from obtaining an education, as some southern states did. By 1850
more than 25% of Ohio's black children aged between six and twenty
were attending schools.80 By 1860 this figure had increased to 39.9%,
pushing Ohio ahead of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York in
the educational opportunity it afforded free blacks.8' A greater per-
centage of black children went to school in Ohio by 1860 than white
children did in Virginia, Tennessee, Florida, Louisiana, and Arkan-
sas.82 In 1860, 5,671 black children age six to twenty, out of a total of
14,202, attended school in Ohio.83 This number was more than the
total in all the fifteen southern states, where more than 90,000 free
black children lived.84
Ohio's responses to black education were, like its policy on black
migration, ambivalent and contradictory. By 1860 two colleges in the
state, Oberlin and Antioch, were integrated, while a third, Wilber-
force, had been created for the express purpose of providing higher
education to blacks. Although these were private institutions, their
very existence underscored the complexity of race relations and the
rights of blacks in Ohio. The Ohio State Supreme court ruled that
children of mixed ancestry who were more than half white could at-
tend schools with whites,85 although, after the legislature provided for
public education for blacks, the court backed off from this position.86
While the laws and the court's dicta in Chalmers v. Stewart did not
seem to allow for integration until 1848, some schools, like those in
79 See generally Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal
Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415, 463-479 (1985-86) (noting that after
1855 "[iun Massachusetts segregated schools were illegal" and "[i]n other parts of New England
practices varied").
80 Id. at 472 (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census, The Seventh Census of the United States:
1850 (1853)). The statistics here use ages 6 through 20 for school age children because of the
census categories. In fact, most children, white and black, probably left school at 16 or younger.
However the United States census only provides data that lumps together all children ages 6
through 20.
Id. at 474.
82 Id. at 474-75 (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistics of the United States in 1860,
507 (1866); Population of the United States in 1860 (1864)). Moreover, the proportion of black
children attending school in Ohio was within one percent of the rate of school attendance for
white children in Georgia (40 percent) and Texas (40.1 percent). The census categories place
school-age children in a category with all people up to age 20. In an age when most children
did not go to school beyond age 16 or 17, this makes it appear that fewer children attended
school than did.
83 Id. at 474.
4 Id.
85 Lane v. Baker, 12 Ohio 238 (1843); Williams v. School Directors, I Wright 578 (Ohio
1834).
86 Van Camp v. Board of Education, 9 Ohio St. 406 (1859).
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Cleveland, were integrated well before then.87  Cincinnati, on the
other hand, refused to create schools for free blacks until forced to by
statutes and court orders. 88
V. THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW AND PROTECTIONS FOR FREE
BLACKS, 1804-1856
Despite the hostile environment created by the black laws, Ohio
provided some significant protections for African Americans within
the state. As already noted, both the 1804 and 1807 laws punished
kidnapping. An anti-kidnapping law89 noted that "unprincipled per-
sons" had "kidnapped free persons of colour" under the pretense that
they were fugitive slaves. 90 To stop this "nefarious and inhuman
practice" 91 the legislature provided a punishment of one to ten years
in the penitentiary or at hard labor for removing, or attempting to re-
move, a free black from the state as a fugitive slave.92 The law fur-
ther provided that before removing a bona fide fugitive slave the mas-
ter had to obtain a certificate of removal from a state magistrate, as
set out in the federal fugitive slave law of 1793.93 An 1831 amend-
ment reduced the maximum penalty for kidnapping to seven years,
but raised the minimum penalty to three years.94
In 1839 the Ohio legislature created an elaborate system for regu-
lating the return of fugitive slaves. 95 The law required that ownership
of fugitive slaves "be proven" to the "satisfaction" of a state judge,
while at the same time authorizing state officials to aid in the return of
bona fide fugitive slaves. 96 This law was consistent with Ohio's long-
standing policy of protecting free blacks from kidnapping while sup-
porting its constitutional obligation to return fugitive slaves. In re-
sponse to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Prigg v. Pennsyl-
vania,97 which barred any state from regulating the return of fugitive
87 KUSMER, supra note 41, at 16-17.
88 State ex rel the Directors of the Eastern and Western School Districts of Cincinnati v.City of Cincinnati, 19 Ohio 178 (1850) (granting a mandamus ordering Cincinnati officials to
spend tax money to pay for schools for blacks.)
89 Act of Jan. 25, 1819, 17 Ohio Laws 56 (punishing kidnapping).
9 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at § 1.
93 "An Act Respecting Fugitives from Justice, and Persons Escaping from the Service of
their Masters," I STAT 302 (1793) (commonly referred to as the 1793 Fugitive Slave Law).
94 Act of Feb. 15, 1831, 29 Ohio Laws 442 (preventing kidnapping).
95 Act of Feb. 26, 1839, 37 Ohio Laws 38.
96 Id. at § 6.
97 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). See generally Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Su-
preme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story's Judicial Nationalism, 1994SUP. CT. REV. 247, 247-94 (discussing how Justice Story used his Prigg opinion to strengthen
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slaves, the legislature repealed this law in 1843 and reinstated the
provisions of the 1831 Act designed to prevent kidnapping.98
The passage of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 reopened the issue,
and within a few years it became the issue of the decade. In 1851 the
Ohio legislature adopted a series of resolutions condemning the new
federal law. The legislature did not, however, pass any new laws to
back-up its outrage.99 In 1856 the legislature urged the state's con-
gressional delegation to work to repeal it as "repugnant to the plainest
principles of justice and humanity."'°
VI. SLAVES IN TRANSIT, 1817-1846
If Ohioans' hostility to the federal fugitive slave laws seems in-
consistent with their antipathy to black immigration, so too do the
decisions Ohio's courts rendered when faced with slaves taken into
the state by their masters. In 1817 an Ohio Chief Justice asserted in
an unreported case that slaves brought into the state by their masters
were free.'0 ' By the 1830s, however, a proslavery reaction reversed
such racial. progressivism. In an unreported case, a court in Cincin-
nati remanded the slave Matilda to her master, after she escaped from
him while they were crossing Ohio. The court did not directly con-
front the issue of slaves in transit, however, because Matilda's lawyer,
Salmon P. Chase, did not forcefully assert the claim. Instead he sim-
ply averred that Matilda "may have escaped from the service of the
claimant during a journey through this state."' 10 2 Thus Chase failed to
directly raise the issue of whether Matilda should be considered a
person freed in transit rather than a fugitive. Instead Chase attacked
the federal fugitive slave law, arguing that state courts could not en-
force it. The Hamilton County court was not about to strike down a
federal statute, and Matilda was remanded to her owner, who quickly
removed her from Ohio.
national power despite the consequences his decision would have "to the liberties of northerners
and to the fate of free blacks (as well as fugitive slaves) living in the North").
98 Act of Jan. 19, 1843, 41 Ohio Laws 13.
99 THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH,
1780-1861, at 164-65 (2001); Gen. Assemb. Res. of Mar. 24, 1851, 49th Gen. Assemb., 49 Ohio
Local Laws 814 (relating "to Slavery and the Fugitive law").
100 S.J. Res. of Apr. 11, 1856, 52d Gen. Assemb., 53 Ohio Laws 247 (relating "to the fugi-
tive slave law").
101 State v. Carneal (1817), in OHIO UNREPORTED JUDICIAL DECISIONS, supra note 44, at
133.
102 SALMON P. CHASE, SPEECH OF SALMON P. CHASE IN THE CASE OF THE COLORED
WOMAN, MATILDA: WHO WAS BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO BY WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, March 11, 1837 (Cincinnati, Pugh &
Dodd 1837).
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Chase had never argued a fugitive slave case before, or indeed any
case involving slavery, and this inexperience might have cost Matilda
her freedom. Chase had only a day to prepare the case, and spent
most of the time being tutored by the abolitionist James G. Birney,
who had provided sanctuary for Matilda when she escaped and then
hired her to work in his house. 10 3 Had the case gone to the Ohio Su-
preme Court, and Chase more forcefully made the transit claim, the
outcome might have been different. A hint of this possibility came a
year later in State v. Birney. 104 Birney, the abolitionist editor of The
Philanthropist, had provided shelter and employment for Matilda
when she initially absconded from her master. Anti-abolitionists in
Cincinnati contrived to have Birney prosecuted under the 1804 Act
for harboring a fugitive slave. The same court that remanded Matilda
to her master convicted Birney under this law. However, the Ohio
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, on the grounds that Bimey
had no reason to know or believe she was a fugitive slave. This out-
come perhaps implies that had Matilda's case reached the Ohio court,
the justices would have found her to be free.' 05
Support for this analysis is found in two cases decided in 1841. In
1839 a group of abolitionists in Clinton County stopped some Vir-
ginians who were taking their slaves through Ohio while en route to
Missouri. The abolitionists informed the slaves that they were free,
and the slaves fled. Seventeen Ohioans were subsequently convicted
of riot, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the convictions in State
v. Farr.106 The reversal was based on an erroneous charge to the jury,
but in dicta the Chief Justice declared that a Virginia slave "became
free when brought to this State by his master, since the Constitution
and the act of Congress, under which alone the state of slavery sub-
sists in Ohio, applies to fugitives only."' 1 7 Niles Weekly Register re-
ported the case under the headline, "NO SLAVERY IN OHIO," and
noted that traveling masters would lose their slaves if they came to
that state. 1
08
At the same time the Supreme Court decided the Farr case, the
Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas upheld the liberty of Mary
Towns, who had been living as a free woman in Cincinnati for a dec-
1
03 BETry FLADELAND, JAMES GILLESPIE BIRNEY: SLAVEHOLDER TO ABOLITIONIST 150-
52 (1955).
104 8 Ohio 230 (1837).
1OS Id.
106State v. Farr, (unreported) (1841), discussed in the CINCINNATI GAZETrE, May 21,
June 1, and June 16, 1841.
1071d. The story of the rescue is found in Letter of Abraham Brooke, THE
PHILANTHROPIST, December 16, 1840.
IN NILES WEEKLY REGISTER, May 29, 1841.
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ade. Judge Nathaniel Read, who as an attorney had represented the
owner in the Matilda Case, determined that Towns had either come
into the state with the consent of her master, or had later been "li-
censed" to remain in Ohio. In either case, she was free because "lib-
erty is the rule, involuntary servitude the exception" in Ohio.109
The Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed this line of decisions in State
v. Hoppess,110 although on factual grounds it ruled in favor of the
slaveowner. Hoppess had been traveling with his slave, Watson, on a
steamboat which docked temporarily in Cincinnati. While the boat
was docked, Watson got off and was found "leaning quietly against a
post on the landing, not a hundred yards from the boat."'' Hoppess
then seized Watson, claiming he was a fugitive slave trying to escape.
Salmon P. Chase obtained a writ of habeas corpus, arguing Watson
became free when his master brought him into Ohio. The Ohio Su-
preme Court asserted that if Hoppess had brought Watson into the
state Watson would indeed be free. However, the Court concluded
that under the Northwest Ordinance, southerners had a right of transit
on the Ohio River that protected their slave property during a stop on
its northern side. Thus, Watson was a fugitive and could not be
freed."12
A year later, Ohio's governor intervened on behalf of a slave who
had gained residence, and thus freedom, in Ohio but had been kid-
napped and taken to Kentucky." 3 Jerry Phinney had been a slave in
Kentucky before his owner allowed him to go to Ohio on a short visit.
Once in Ohio, Phinney chose freedom and refused to return to Ken-
tucky. He had been living in Columbus for about sixteen years when
his Kentucky owner hired Forbes and Armitage, who kidnapped him
and brought him back to Kentucky. Ohio indicted the two men for
kidnapping and sent a lawyer, William Johnston, to Kentucky to ar-
gue for their extradition to Ohio. A Kentucky court released the two
men, concluding that Phinney was actually a fugitive slave, and thus
no kidnapping had taken place. In his futile attempt to get Kentucky
109See CINCINNATI GAZETTE, May 21 and June 1, 1841. See also THE PHILANTHROPIST
(Mt. Pleasant, OH), June 16 and 30, 1841.
10 State v. Hoppess, 2 WEST. L.J. 279, 333-50 (Ohio 1845).
I Id.
1
2 Id. For a more detailed analysis of this case, see FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION,
supra note 38, at 167-72.
113 STATE OF OHIO V. FORBES AND ARMITAGE, ARRESTED UPON THE REQUISITION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF OHIO ON CHARGE OF KIDNAPPING JERRY PHINNEY, AND TRIED BEFORE THE
FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT OF KENTUCKY (APRIL 10, 1846), reprinted in I FUGITIVE SLAVES
AND AMERICAN COURTS: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE 269 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988); see
also FINKELMAN, supra note 38, at 172-74 (describing how Governor Bartley believed that
Phinney's residence in Ohio, with his master's consent, had freed him and supported this belief
by "seeking the arrest and trial of his kidnappers").
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to return the kidnappers, Johnston cited State v. Hoppess for the
proposition that Phinney became free when his owner allowed him to
visit Ohio. While Ohio was unable to prosecute the kidnappers or
help Phinney regain his liberty, the case illustrates Ohio's growing
commitment to black freedom, even if it meant increasing the number
of blacks in the state.
VII. TOWARD A FREE OHIO: 1849-1861
In 1849 the Ohio legislature was almost evenly divided between
Whigs and Democrats, but neither party had a majority, thanks to a
small group of Free Soilers, an alliance of antislavery politicians from
both parties. In a complicated bargain, the Free Soilers helped the
Democrats organize and control the legislature. In return, the Democ-
rats agreed to elect Salmon P. Chase, by now known as the "Attorney
General for Fugitive Slaves," to the U.S. Senate and to repeal most of
the black laws. In addition, the Free Soilers prevented the re-election
of Nathaniel Read to the Supreme Court, because antislavery activists
had never forgiven Read for his role in the Matilda case and his deci-
sion to remand Watson to his master in State v. Hoppess. 114
Antislavery Whigs from the Western Reserve "sat in mute aston-
ishment" as the Democrats, "like a flock of sheep clearing a barn yard
gate," one after another voted to repeal the black laws." 5  When the
dust had settled, race relations in Ohio were permanently altered. All
of the registration provisions of the 1804 and 1807 laws were gone. 1 6
Blacks could now testify against whites, enter the state without prov-
ing they were free, and obtain an education in a state-supported
school, although in most places these would be segregated.
The black law repeal was only the beginning of an extraordinary
dozen years, as the landscape of race and law in Ohio was trans-
formed. This transformation was tied directly to national politics,
especially the breathtaking growth of the Republican Party and the
crisis in law caused by the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850.
In 1852 the Whig party virtually collapsed, as the Democrats
swept the Congress and the White House. Emboldened by this vic-
114 See FINKELMAN, supra note 38, at 172 n.75 (discussing how the Free Soilers convinced
the Democrats to abandon their support of Read); FREDERICK J. BLUE, SALMON P. CHASE: A
LIFE IN POLITICS 67-74 (1987) (discussing Chase's role as "a behind-the scences 'compro-
miser' for the Free Soil movement as well as his ambition for elected office).
115 STEPHEN E. MAIZLISH, THE TRIUMPH OF SECTIONALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
OHIO POLITICS, 1844-1856, at 136 (1983) (citations omitted).
16 Act of Feb. 10, 1849, § 6, 47 Ohio Laws 17, 18 (authorizing "the establishment of sepa-
rate schools for the education of colored children" and quietly repealing the 1804 and 1807
acts).
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tory, in 1854 the Democrats in Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska
Act, which allowed slavery in most of the remaining federal territo-
ries. By repealing part of the Missouri Compromise, which had
banned slavery in the region, the new law set off an unprecedented
political reaction, which quickly led to the creation of the new Repub-
lican Party, the first mainstream political party openly opposed to
slavery. In Ohio the party attracted most former Whigs, as well as
anti-slavery Democrats, Free Soilers, and Liberty party men. In 1856
Salmon P. Chase became one of the first Republicans in the nation to
be elected as a governor,' 17 serving two terms, through 1860. He
would be followed by William Dennison, another antislavery Repub-
lican.
In 1856 the Ohio Supreme Court, with Republican leadership,
ruled, in an officially reported case, that slaves became free the mo-
ment their masters brought them into the state.' This resolved any
of the ambiguities left over from State v. Farr and State v. Hoppess.
The case made clear how strongly antislavery Ohio law had become.
It involved a suit against Henry Poindexter, brought by a Kentucky
slaveowner, John Anderson. Poindexter had been Anderson's slave
in Kentucky, but Anderson had allowed Poindexter to visit Ohio,
work there, and then return to Kentucky with his earnings. Eventu-
ally Anderson agreed to allow Poindexter to buy his freedom, and
Poindexter signed a number of notes that his white friends in Ohio co-
signed. When Poindexter reached Ohio he defaulted on the notes, and
his co-signers refused to honor them. In a brief opinion, Justice Ozias
Bowen held that Poindexter became free the moment his master let
him come to Ohio, and thus his "subsequent return" to Kentucky
could have no effect on his status. Thus, because Poindexter was
free, the notes were void for lack of consideration. With some irony,
Justice Bowen also pointed out that under Kentucky law a contract
between a slave and master was void, and thus, even if he applied the
law of Anderson's home state, there would be no valid contract.
While Bowen's opinion was short and legalistic, Justice Joseph
Swan, a leading light of the Republican Party,"1 9 took the then highly
unusual step of presenting an elaborate twenty-five page concurring
117 On Jan. 3, 1855 Anson P. Morrill (Maine) and Kinsley Bingham (Michigan) became
the first Republican governors in the nation. Chase was elected later that year and took office
on Jan. 14, 1856. Stephen Royce was elected governor of Vermont in 1854 as a Whig and
became a Republican while in office.
118 Anderson v. Poindexter, 6 Ohio St. 622 (1856).
11
9 See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
252-56 (1975) (discussing Swan as an antislavery jurist and, in particular, his opinion in Ex
Parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859)).
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opinion detailing the history of the right of states to emancipate visit-
ing slaves.
One year later the Republican-controlled legislature reaffirmed this
decision with a statute making it a crime for anyone to "bring into this
state any other person, with intent to hold or control" that person as a
slave.120 The statute further asserted that "every person," except a
fugitive slave coming into the State, "shall be deemed and held in all
courts as absolutely free."' 12' By this time almost all the northern
states had adopted the rule, first articulated by Lord Mansfield in
Somerset v. Stewart,122 that slaves became free when brought to a
non-slave jurisdiction. Some states had done this by judicial decision
and some by statute. But no state had taken the extreme step that
Ohio did in 1857 of criminalizing the act of bringing a slave into a
free state. Under the Ohio law, a master traveling on a steamboat
with his slave on the Ohio River would not only lose the slave if the
boat docked in Cincinnati, but might also lose his own freedom.
In 1858 the state legislature, now controlled by Democrats favor-
able to the proslavery administration of President James Buchanan,
repealed this law.' 23 Because the governor could not veto laws in
Ohio, Salmon P. Chase could only watch helplessly. Significantly,
however, the Democrats did not dare to pass a law explicitly allowing
slave transit. Even Democrats in Ohio were unprepared to challenge
the idea that all people in Ohio were free unless their status was de-
termined otherwise by the federal Fugitive Slave Law.
Events after 1857 confirmed the remarkable sea change that had
taken place in Ohio. In 1804 the state had staked out a position of
hostility to black immigration. This had been reaffirmed in 1807.
The statutes, and thus the official policy of the state remained basi-
cally unchanged until 1849, when the black laws were repealed. By
1857 the Ohio Supreme Court and the state legislature were on record
as emphatically offering freedom to any blacks who might come into
the state, except fugitive slaves. No longer opposed to black immi-
gration, Ohio was now a relatively safe haven for southern blacks
seeking a refuge from slavery.
1
20 Act of Apr. 17, 1857, § 1, 54 Ohio Laws 186, 186.
1
2 1 Id.
122 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772). For a full discussion of the application of Somerset in
American law, see FINKELMAN, supra note 38.
123 Act of March 27, 1858, 55 Ohio Laws 19 (repealing the Act of Apr. 17, 1857).
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VII. CRISIS
The passage of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 created a crisis in
American politics. Throughout the North, the law was greeted with
hostility and sometimes with dramatic and violent resistance. In 1850
and 1851 abolitionists in Boston and Syracuse liberated fugitive
slaves from federal custody in the famous Shadrach and Jerry Res-
cues; in Christiana, Pennsylvania fugitive slaves killed a master and
wounded other whites as they successfully resisted recapture. In 1854
abolitionists led by Sherman Booth rescued a fugitive slave in Racine,
Wisconsin. That year a mob attacked a jail in Boston in an unsuc-
cessful attempt to rescue the fugitive slave Anthony Bums. This as-
sault on the jail left one federal deputy dead. Ministers railed against
the law from the pulpit, northern politicians who supported the law
were often punished at the polls, and black and white opponents of
slavery banded together in many cities to form vigilance committees
to expose slave catchers and prevent them from seizing fugitive
slaves or free blacks. A key northern supporter of the law, Senator
Daniel Webster, was mocked and vilified by his Massachusetts con-
stituents, condemned as an "Ichobod"-a traitor to his state and re-
gion.
Southern states viewed this opposition to the law as proof that the
North no longer supported the Constitution or the bargain that led to
it. The South ignored the fact that the overwhelming majority of fugi-
tive slaves seized under the law were successfully returned to their
masters, usually without incident. 124 More important to the South was
the resistance in the North, and especially state personal liberty laws
which were designed to frustrate the implementation of the 1850 Law.
To counteract the Fugitive Slave Act, in 1857 the Republican-
dominated legislature passed three new personal liberty laws. One,
discussed above, made it a crime to hold someone as a slave within
the state. Another closed Ohio's jails to slave catchers. 25 The third
punished kidnapping of free blacks, 26 and mandated a sentence of
three to eight years at hard labor in the penitentiary for anyone who
might "kidnap or forcibly or fraudulently carry off or decoy out of
this state any black or mulatto person or persons" without following
124 See generally STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: THE ENFORCEMENT OF
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970)
(1968) (analyzing the return of fugitive slaves and showing that the overwhelming majority of
fugitives were in fact returned without incident).
125 Act of Apr. 16, 1857, 54 Ohio Laws 170 (prohibiting "the confinement of fugitives
from slavery in the jails of Ohio").
126 Act of Apr. 17, 1857, 54 Ohio Laws 221 (preventing kidnapping).
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the procedures of the federal Fugitive Slave Law. 27 While this law
might be seen as an attempt to aid in the enforcement of the federal
law, it was in fact designed to prevent masters from exercising a right
of self help--to seize alleged fugitives and hurry them across the
Ohio River into Kentucky or Virginia, without going through the
formalities of the federal law.
In 1858 the legislature, now controlled by Democrats, repealed
two of the 1857 laws.1 28 One year later the Democrats passed a law
requiring jailors to accept fugitive slaves when in the custody of the
federal officials. 1
29
The legal instability from 1857 through 1859 illustrates the impor-
tance of politics to Ohio race relations. The Republicans used their
political power to chip away at the Fugitive Slave Act and to protect
both free blacks and runaway slaves. The Democrats taking their
cues from the proslavery policies of the Buchanan administration,
tried to support the fugitive slave laws and aid in the return of run-
away slaves. But, significantly, even they did not repeal the anti-
kidnapping law of 1857, which created the harshest penalties yet for
those who attempted to remove bona fide free blacks from the state.
While the legislature went back and forth on the question of fugi-
tive slaves, three cases involving fugitive slaves and free blacks
threatened to bring the state into collision with the federal govern-
ment and its slave state neighbors.
In 1858, students and faculty from Oberlin College and other resi-
dents from the area raced to nearby Wellington, Ohio where they res-
cued a fugitive slave held in federal custody under the Fugitive Slave
Act. One witness estimated the crowd at approximately one thousand
people, although a federal grand jury would later conclude that only
about 200 people had been in the mob that rescued the slave. In any
event, the mob was successful, and the alleged slave, a man known
only as "John," was soon spirited away, probably to Canada.
In December of 1858, a federal grand jury indicted thirty-seven
men for their part in the rescue. Federal officials expected the defen-
dants, many of them Oberlin students, to post bail. But all refused,
which created a crisis because there were limited jail facilities in the
area. Meanwhile, a local grand jury brought an indictment for kid-
napping against four of the people who had seized John. Ultimately
the federal government tried and convicted only two of the abolition-
127 1d. at § 2.
128 Act of Feb. 23, 1858, 55 Ohio Laws 10 (repealing Act of Apr. 16, 1857); Act of Mar.
27, 1858, 55 Ohio Laws 19 (repealing Act of Apr. 17, 1857).
129 Act of Apr. 4, 1859, 56 Ohio Laws 158 (amending Section 1 and repealing Section 2 of
the Act of Dec. 20, 1806).
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ist defendants: Simeon Bushnell and Charles Langston. The rest
were released after being fined a nominal ten dollars, which many of
them later refused to pay.
While in federal custody, Bushnell and Langston sought a writ of
habeas corpus from the Ohio Supreme Court. This set the stage for a
potential crisis. If the Ohio court issued the writ of habeas corpus
directed at the federal marshal, there might be a serious confrontation
between the state and federal government. While the court was con-
sidering the matter, Governor Chase made it clear that if a writ of
habeas corpus was issued "that process should be executed."' 130 Chase
was in fact prepared to call out the militia to confront federal officials
to enforce a writ issued by the highest court of the "Sovereign State"
of Ohio. 13 1 He did not have to push things this far, because the court
did not issue the writ. Had it done so, Ohio was ready to push the
constitutional issues to the brink of civil war over the fate of a white
(Bushnell) and a black (Langston) abolitionist who had broken the
federal law to protect the liberty of a black man who had found sanc-
tuary in Ohio. In the five-and-one-half decades since statehood,
Ohio's official position on race had clearly and dramatically changed.
Fortunately, the Ohio justices dodged the crisis. In Ex parte Bush-
nell, Ex parte Langston,132 the Ohio Supreme Court refused to inter-
vene on their behalf. The swing vote on the Court was a leading Re-
publican and an avowed opponent of slavery, Chief Justice Joseph
Swan, who voted with the two Democrats on the court, claiming that
the state court had no power to interfere with the enforcement of a
federal law.
Swan did not act out of hostility toward blacks, since he had previ-
ously supported black rights in Ohio, but he was unwilling to chal-
lenge the United States Supreme Court and the federal government.
Rather, as Robert Cover argues, Swan felt constrained by legal for-
malism and his oath of office to uphold federal law. This decision
probably ruined Swan's career, who at the time was a leading light of
the Republican Party.' 33 But, whatever his motives, Swan's vote was
unacceptable to Ohio Republicans, who refused to renominate him for
130 MORRIS, supra note 99 at 187 (quoting Chase).
'13 Id.
1329 Ohio St. 77 (1859).
1.3 See COVER, supra note 118, at 252-56 (discussing how this case harmed Swan's ca-
reer). The cost to Swan may have been enormously high. From 1860 to 1908 four Ohio politi-
cians (Hayes, Garfield, McKinley, and Taft) and one Ohio native son (Grant) were elected
President. In addition Ohio produced two chief justices of the U.S. Supreme Court (Chase and
Morrison Waite) and two associate justices (Noah Swayne and Stanley Mathews), It is not
impossible to imagine that Swan could have gone from the Ohio court to Congress or the gover-
nor's mansion and then to the White House or the U.S. Supreme Court.
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the court. Ohio Republicans were not sympathetic to a legal formalist
who failed to protect the liberty of black and white abolitionists. 34
Jacob Brinkerhoff, on the other hand, who dissented in the case, re-
ceived full Republican support in 1860 and was reelected in the "most
brilliant" victory "ever achieved in the State by the Republican
party.' 35
While chief executive of the state, Chase was able to assert the
power of his state to protect one black resident, Willis Lago, who was
indicted in Kentucky for helping a slave escape to Ohio. Chase re-
fused to return Lago to Kentucky for prosecution, arguing that the
crime of "slave stealing" did not exist in Ohio.
Kentucky officials waited until a new governor took office, but
William Dennison was no more cooperative than Chase. The Attor-
ney General of Ohio told Dennison that Lago had not committed a
crime recognized by Ohio "or by the common law.' ' 136 Kentucky then
sought help from the U.S. Supreme Court which determined in Ken-
tucky v. Dennison'37 that it did not have the power to force a state to
return a fugitive from justice to another state. The narrow result of
this decision appeared to support antislavery, but this was not Chief
Justice Taney's purpose. Rather, his goal was to create a precedent
that limited the power of the national government to force states to act
in support of the U.S. Constitution. With seven states out of the Un-
ion, the proslavery, southern nationalist Taney hoped to offer consti-
tutional protection for the newly created Confederate States of Amer-
ica.
While Kentucky v. Dennison was making its way through the
court, Ohio went to great lengths to recover the family of Peyton
Polly. In 1850 kidnappers seized seven of Polly' s children and one of
his grandchildren, taking them to Virginia and Kentucky where they
were sold as slaves. In 1851 the legislature authorized the governor
to "inquire into the facts of' this "alleged seizure and abduction," and
to "employ counsel, and adopt such other measures as shall conduce
most speedily to restore" the Polly children "to their liberty."' 38 The
Governor of Ohio did this, and in Kentucky the attorney representing
Ohio was successful. There the Attorney General James Harlan, the
father of future United States Supreme Court Justice John Marshall
14Id.
1-35 4 EUGENE H. ROSEBOOM, THE HISTORY OF THE STATE OF OHIO: THE CIVIL WAR ERA,
1850-1873, at 370-71 (1944) (citations omitted).
'
36 Letter from C.P. Wolcott, Attorney General of Ohio, to William Dennison, Governor of
Ohio (Apr. 14, 1860) (on file with the Ohio Historical Society).
137 Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860).
138 Gen. Assemb. Res. of Mar. 20, 1851, 49 Ohio Local Laws 811 (relating "to the abduc-
tion of the children and grand child of Peyton Polly").
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Harlan, intervened to help secure the 
liberty of four of the Polly chil-
dren, who were returned to Ohio. 
Ohio continued to authorize sub-
stantial funds to pay legal fees to bring 
to Ohio the Polly children in
Virginia. 39 However, authorities in Virginia 
stonewalled,' 40 and the
four Polly children in that state did 
not gain their freedom until the
Civil War.
Ohio's response to the Oberlin rescue, 
the Lago case, and the Pey-
ton Polly kidnappings once again underscores 
the enormous change in
the political culture that had taken place 
in Ohio between 1804 and
1860. In 1804 Ohio embarked on a policy 
to discourage blacks from
coming into the state and settling there. 
By 1860 Ohio was willing to
spend its resources to challenge a 
neighboring state and even the na-
tional government in order to protect 
the liberty of free blacks and
fugitive slaves in its jurisdiction. Blacks still did 
not have full equal-
ity in the state, but the state was willing 
to expend resources and risk
undermining national and interstate harmony 
to ensure that blacks had
a safe haven. The legislature and the 
executive branch provided pub-
lic support, and public money, to 
protect the freedom of blacks in
Ohio.
VIII. THE MIDWEST AGAINST SLAVERY
Since the early 1960s, most historians 
and other scholars writing
about race relations in antebellum Ohio 
and the rest of the antebellum
"west" have focused on the racism 
of the region. This view is ex-
pressed best by Leon Litwack' s assertion 
that on the eve of the Civil
War "the Northern Negro remained 
largely disenfranchised, segre-
gated and economically oppressed" 
and, just as importantly, "change
did not seem imminent
.
"
1 41 Similarly, Eugene Berwanger's influen-
tial book The Frontier Against Slavery 
claimed that "[dliscrimination
against Negroes in the Middle West 
reached its height between 1846
and 1860, the same years in which 
the slavery extension controversy
became most acute."
142 Berwanger argued that his book "reveals 
that
prejudice against Negroes was a factor in the 
development of anti-
slavery feeling in the ante-bellum 
United States.' 43 Relying on the
scholarship of Litwack, Berwanger, 
and others, the conservative legal
scholar Raoul Berger asserted that 
the "key to an understanding of the
139 Joint Resolution Relative to the 
kidnapping of the Polly family, 57 Ohio 
Laws 149
19 0 See Ratcliff v. Polly, 53 Va. (12 Gratt) 528 (1855).
141 LITWACK, supra note 1, at 279.
142 BERWANGER, supra note 2, at 4.
143 Id. at 1.
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Fourteenth Amendment is that the North was shot through with
Negrophobia."' 44
The history of race and law in Ohio suggests that this analysis is
fundamentally wrong. From 1802 until the 1830s the state was
deeply Negrophobic. Ohio had minimal interest in the welfare of its
blacks citizens; but even in that period, anti-kidnapping laws and ju-
dicial decisions offered blacks some protections and some rights.
Moreover, the dramatic growth of Ohio's black population in this
period suggests that the reality for blacks in the state was far different
than what the statutes would suggest. Blacks poured into the state,
while the registration and surety bond laws were ignored.
In the 1840s and 1850s Ohio changed dramatically. Between 1846
and 1860-the period Berwanger identifies as the worst for blacks in
the Midwest-Ohio repealed most of its black laws, gave blacks the
right to testify against whites, guaranteed them access to public edu-
cation, and passed a strong personal liberty law. Ohio governors
sought to protect black freedom and recover free blacks kidnapped
and taken South, while the state supreme court emphatically held that
any slave brought into the state immediately became free. These
were not the worst years for Ohio antebellum blacks, but the best.
Contrary to Litwack's view, change for the better was on the horizon.
Antislavery governors like Chase and Dennison offered the promise
of basic racial justice and hoped to lead the state to full equality.
Ohio's commitment to the Union cause and the Republican cause
would prove to be a commitment to emancipation and ultimately
equal rights.
Berwanger's theory that the frontier was against slavery because of
racism does fit early Ohio, when the majority of the population was in
the southern part of the state, and the majority of the settlers were
transplants from the slave states. Berwanger in fact describes a
southern frontier that had been hostile both to slavery and blacks. But
by the 1840s the Ohio population was no longer southern. The major-
ity of the state had New England roots or had become culturally mid-
western. No longer the frontier, mid-century Ohio was more tolerant
of African Americans and more emphatically intolerant of slavery. It
represented what might be called "the Midwest against slavery." That
culture would soon dominate national politics, producing every
elected president but one between 1860 and 1900.
In the end Ohio offers an important key to understanding the Four-
teenth Amendment. The author of the Amendment, John Bingham,
14RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 10 (1977).
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came from Ohio, and the committee that wrote it included another
Ohio congressman, James Ashley. The key to the amendment is not
the constricted, narrow understanding-the pro-segregationist
key-that Berger claimed to find. The history of mid-century Ohio
was not one that was "shot through with Negrophobia." Rather, it
was a complex state where Negrophobes could certainly be found, but
where the political majority had clearly shifted away from Negropho-
bia and toward racial fairness. The key to understanding the Four-
teenth Amendment is that Ohio had repealed its black laws, provided
public education for many of their children, integrated some of its
schools, offered freedom to slaves in transit, attempted to provide a
secure environment to its free black residents, and when the Republi-
cans were in power attempted to provide a safer-haven for free blacks
and fugitive slaves. It was a state with a rapidly growing free black
population where many blacks owned property and even a few held
public office. The origins of the Fourteenth Amendment lie in the
antislavery politics that sometimes dominated and always influenced
Ohio in this period. Among the antislavery leaders in Ohio were the
author of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congressman John A. Bingham
of Cadiz, and a host of other Ohio antislavery men who became the
core leaders of the Republican Party. These include: Benjamin F.
Wade, Salmon P. Chase, Jacob Brinkerhoff, James M. Ashley, Robert
C. Schenck, Edward Wade, and Joshua Giddings. All of them pushed
for racial justice at the state and national level from the 1840s through
the end of Reconstruction.
In the late 1860s these antislavery Republicans were the vanguard
of the party that was in power. They helped write the three Civil War
Amendments and pushed them through Congress and then secured
their ratification in the states. Their constitutional vision was formed
by the struggles for racial fairness in the three antebellum decades.
Their success in those years informs our understanding of their vision
and their constitutional legacy.
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